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Whether the doctrine is applicable or will be applied to change of
venue statutes in future cases remains to be seen; but it can be safely
said that unless the various legislatures take some action to repeal or
amend change of venue statutes that impose limitations which have the
effect of circumventing the purpose of allowing change, most courts will
feel bound by the language of the statutes.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in its pronouncement of the "reasonable likelihood" test as the measure of evidentiary showing warranting a change
of venue, obviously realizes that in many instances such safeguards as
voir dire examination of prospective jurors does not detect prejudice
or the effect of pretrial publicity on a given community. It appears
that the Court constructs a very liberal test for insuring the constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial. However, the writer submits
that change of venue laws that impose limitations on the place or number of changes do not enhance this given constitutional right. In spite
of the policy pronounced by legislatures, the trial judge in granting a
change of venue must operate with a view of carrying out the guarantee
enunciated in the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution.
CURTIS

0.

HARRIS

In the Matter of: Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hospital, Inc.:
Impasse for Regulation of Hospital Construction in North Carolina?
In January, 1973, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the
1971 certificate of need law was void because its application to Aston
Park Hospital, Inc. resulted in a deprivation of liberty without due
process of law, established a monopoly in existing hospitals, and
granted exclusive privileges to existing hospitals in violation of the Constitution of North Carolina.' Prior to Aston Park, certificate of need
laws had been challenged in courts in California2 and New York,3 and
in both cases, the laws were upheld.
The certificate of need legislation was a regulatory measure enacted
1. In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d

729 (1973).
2. Simon v. Cameron, 337 F. Supp. 1380 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
3. Attoma v. State Dep't of Social Welfare, 26 App. Div. 2d 12, 270 N.Y.S.2d

167

(1966).
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to control the cost of health care4 by limiting expansion of existing
medical care facilities or entrance into the health care field by new facilities.5 It provided that the State agency which administered the
licensing laws for medical care facilities make a determination of need
as a precondition to issuing or continuing a license. 6 The Medical Care
Commission, as the State licensing agency, was given the power to withhold issuance of a certificate of need unless the proposed facility would
provide new or additional inpatient facilities in the area to be served,
could be economically accomplished and maintained, and would contribute to the orderly development of adequate and effective health
services.7 The Commission was to consider four factors in making its
determination of need: (1) the size, composition, and growth of the
population of the area to be served; (2) the number of existing and
planned facilities of similar types; (3) the extent of utilization of existing facilities; and (4) the availability of facilities or services which may
serve as alternatives or substitutes."
Aston Park was a private, non-profit hospital owning and operating
a 50-bed general hospital in Asheville, North Carolina.9 Its application
for a certificate of need for construction of a 200-bed general hospital
to replace the smaller facility was denied by the Commission on the
ground that it "would be an unnecessary and weakening duplication of
services and undesirable dilution of physicians' time in treating patients
at widely separated hospitals." 10 The Commission's determination was
based partially on findings that, at the time, seven general hospitals with
a total bed capacity of 978 served the planning area which included
Asheville, that three of the seven were located in Asheville and had
a bed capacity of 641, and that by 1977, ninety-four more beds would
be needed in Asheville, but that ninety of these had already been approved for addition to another existing facility through plans filed prior
to enactment of the certificate of need legislation."
The Commission's contentions were that in Asheville there existed
a shortage of doctors and adequately trained hospital staff workers; that
4. When unneeded beds are added to a community by a public hospital, operating
expenses increase because of construction costs, and the increase is passed on to the public. See, e.g., A. SOMERS, HosPrrIAL REGULATION: THE DILEMMA OF PUBLIC POLICY

(1969).

When the excess beds are implanted into the community by a private hospital,

would-be patients of the existing public facilities may be lured to the newer facility,
thereby depriving the public hospital of patient revenue.
5. Ch. 113, [19731 N.C. Sess. Laws, repealing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-289 to -291
(Supp.1973).

6. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-291(b) (1971)
7. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-291(c) (1971)

(repealed 1973).
(repealed 1973).

8. Id.
9. 289 N.C. at 542, 543, 193 S.E.2d at 730.

10. Id.
11. Id.
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excess hospital construction would spread hospital employees more
thinly and endanger adequate care of patients; that doctor's time could
be more efficiently used if total bed capacity were concentrated; that
excess bed capacity would result in a substantial number of vacant beds
and rooms; that certain overhead costs increase with the number of
beds whether occupied or vacant; and that the overhead cost of vacant
beds must be absorbed by patients using the beds.' 2 They concluded
that the effect of excess hospital
bed capacity will be less efficient ser13
vice to patients at greater cost.
The court's response to the Commission's contentions was that "compulsory curtailment of facilities for the care of the sick is not a reasonable remedy for a shortage of trained hospital personnel, nurses and
doctors. 1' 4 The court added that the Constitution prohibited the Legislature from authorizing the Medical Care Commission to forbid Aston
Park to proceed with its construction merely because to do so endangers
the ability of other established hospitals to keep all their beds occupied.'"
The factor which can be said to have influenced the court most in
its ruling was the merits of the free enterprise system.' 6 Much emphasis was placed upon the evils of monopolies and the attributes of competition. The court pointed out that though a hospital is not directly
comparable to ordinary businesses, when competition is introduced, the
effects should be similar, i.e., lower prices, better service, and more
efficient management. 17 Even if prices rise in response to competition,
the8court felt the better service and improved methods would be worth
1
it.
The uniqueness of the services rendered by hospitals and the importance of these services to the public does not place them outside the
category of ordinary businesses according to the court's ruling. No
reasonable relation was found by the court between the Commission's
denial of a certificate of need to Aston Park and the promotion of the
public health.' 9
A careful reading of the opinion indicates that if either of two situations had existed, the legislation may have been upheld. First, the
court noted that Aston Park owned the site for the proposed hospital
and that no public funds would be required for the construction or
12. Id. at 548, 193 S.E.2d at 730.
13. Id.
14. Id.

15. Id.
16. Id. at 549-50, 193 S.E.2d at 734-35.

17. Id. at 549, 193 S.E.2d at 734.
18. Id.
19.

Id. at 551, 193 S.E.2d at 735.
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equipping thereof. 20 These factors might lead one to infer that had
the application for a certificate of need for a similar proposed facility
been made by a public hospital, the court would have upheld the Commission's decision. 2 ' Second, because the Medical Care Commission
has no rate regulation power, the hospital industry does not fit into the
category of business where the State protects the public from the consequences of monopoly, as in the case of regulation of public utilities
by the Utilities Commission.2 2 In balancing the exercise of the State's
police power against public interest, the court said that it was a lesser
exercise of such power to regulate rates than to deny the right to engage
in business, and a stronger public benefit must be shown for the latter
to withstand constitutional attack.2 3 This suggests that if price regulation had been coupled with the certificate of need legislation, the court
may not have ruled it unconstitutional. 2 4
The court's decision left North Carolina with no state controls over
hospital construction or expansion.2 5 With unrestrained construction,
public hospitals are afraid of cream skimming on the part of private
hospitals. There are two types of cream skimming in the health care
industry. The first is excluding patients with conditions that have low
utilization of profitable testing services or require expensive facilities
for treatment or who do not pay full charges or depend on government
subsidization of medical bills. The second is offering "profitable"
services while not offering services which result in high investment and
unit cost but are utilized at a low level. 26 Another fear is that
unregulated hospital construction will result in a greater demand for the
available supply of doctors and adequately trained hospital staff and
workers, and in lower utilization of services in existing health care facilities.2 7 For example, the construction of Aston Park's new facility
would create an excess of hospital beds in the Asheville area and result
in increased costs to the existing hospitals. The occupancy rate for the
three Asheville hospitals was 86.3% in 197 1,28 86.6% in 1972,29 and
20. Id. at 543, 193 S.E.2d at 729.
21. Comment, Hospital Regulation After Aston Park: Substantive Due Process in
North Carolina, 52 N.C.L. REV. 763, 794 (1974).
22. 289 N.C. at 550, 193 S.E.2d at 734-35.
23. Id. at 550, 193 S.E.2d at 735. For a treatment of the substantive due process
issues of Aston Park, see 52 N.C.L. REV. 763.
24. 52 N.C.L. REV. 763, 803. See also, C. Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services by "Certificate of Need", 59 VA. L. REV. 1144 n.3 (1973).
25. No action toward this end has been taken by the North Carolina legislature
since Aston Park.
26. D. Stewart, The History and Status of ProprietaryHospitals, BLUE CROSS REPORTS RESEARCH SERIES NINE

2, 6-7 (March, 1973).

27. 52 N.C.L. REv. 763, 790-92.
28. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, HOSPITAL STATIs-Ics 55 (1971).
29, AMRICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, HosPrTAL STATISTICS 168 (1972).
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88% in 1973.30 The twelve percent vacancy rate in 1973 means that
approximately seventy-seven beds were vacant each day. Consequently,
the addition of 150 beds by Aston Park into an already underutilized
area means higher costs to the public, either through increased patient
charges or local taxation.
The future of regulation of hospital construction in North Carolina
remains uncertain. It appears that the State's law-makers are confronted with two choices. North Carolina may be content to leave such
legislation off its books and let federal legislation fill the void, or it may
make another effort at introducing its own certificate of need law.
As for the first alternative, under Public Law 92-603," 1 designated
planning agencies are supported by federal funds.8 2 These agencies
review proposed capital expenditures 3 for health care facilities and
determine need. Upon a determination that such capital expenditure
is not needed, the penalty to the facility for proceeding with the
expenditure is a reduction in reimbursement 4 to the facility for covered
expenses incurred by patients eligible for benefits
under Medicare,3 5
6 and the Crippled Childrens' Program.17
Medicaid,
Immediately apparent is the fact that the consequences of a determination that a proposed facility is not needed under the federal law are
less severe than were those under North Carolina's statutes. In estimating the effectiveness of Pub. L. No. 92-603, it can be seen that upon the occurrence of either of two events it will operate to restrain construction and expansion of private health care facilities when such construction or expansion will disrupt health care planning in the area and
result in increased costs for public facilities. One way for private hospitals to feel the impact of Pub. L. No. 92-603 is to channel more patients whose medical expenses are federally subsidized into their
beds.38 The most effective method of achieving this would be through
adoption of a national health insurance plan which covers all U.S.
residents and is handled in the same manner as current federal health
insurance programs. The sanctions authorized by Pub. L. No. 92-603
30. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, HOSPrrAL STATISTICS 168 (1974 ed.).
31. Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603.
32. Id.
33. Capital expenditure is defined as "an expenditure which, under generally accepted accounting principles, is not properly chargeable as an expense of operation and
maintenance and which (1) exceeds $100,000, (2) changes the bed capacity of the facility with respect to which such expenditure is made, or (3) substantially changes the
services of the facility with respect to which such expenditure is made.
34. The reduction in reimbursement is by the amount attributable to expenses related to the unneeded capital expenditure.
35. 42 U.S.C. 701 (1966).
36. 42 U.S.C. 1395 (1966).
37. 42 U.S.C. 1396 (1966).
38. 52 N.C.L. REv. 763, 794 n.152.
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for proceeding with unneeded expansion or construction would then
reduce reimbursement to private hospitals substantially and give the
planning agencies the power necessary to oversee health care facilities'
growth. Until a national health insurance plan of the type mentioned
comes into existence, the only other way for Pub. L. No. 92-603 to
work is through consumer awareness. That is, the public must be
informed of unnecessary expansion and construction by private hospitals and the cost effect on the public hospitals. Their reaction must
then be a "boycott" of the facility which has ignored the determination
of the planning agency.
If North Carolina selects the second alternative, regulation through
its own legislature, it must pay heed to the decision of the court in
Aston Park. The only legislation that the court might tolerate must
be in the form of certificate of need requirements which apply only
to public hospitals or rate regulation coupled with certificate of need
requirements. In the first case, however, a certificate of need law
which applies only to public hospitals would serve no useful purpose
because there would continue to be no regulation of private construction, which is precisely the problem posed by Aston Park. Thus, local
and out-of-state private hospitals seeking to expand could do so freely
in North Carolina. The result might be that public hospitals would be
phased out of areas where private facilities operate. In the second
case, health care facilities would be placed in the class of public utilities. Rate regulation would be the measure to protect the public from
the dangers of monopoly which the court says is created through certificate of need legislation. Fears of lower quality service3" resulting
from a grant of statutory monopoly status could be dispelled by implementing minimum standards guidelines governing entry and/or tenure
of a facility in the health care industry.
CONCLUSION

The nature of the services provided by hospitals sets them apart from
ordinary businesses. The life supporting functions rendered should be
available to all when needed. The size of one's bank account should
never be a decisive factor in the hospital admissions office.
The health care industry is one of vital public interest. Through
donations and tax payments, the public has contributed to the construction and maintenance of its own hospitals. Therefore, the public
interest extends not only to receiving high quality and low cost services,
but to seeing that the institutions that it supports keep their doors open.
This is a case where free enterprise must give way to governmental
39. See, e.g., Somers, supra note 4.
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regulation and control. Because of the questionable status and future
of national health insurance, reliance by North Carolina on federal regulation is not feasible for the present. Until such time as the sanctions
under Pub. L. No. 92-603 become effective to curtail expansion by
cream skimming private hospitals, the State must shoulder the burden.
In assuming this role, North Carolina should adopt legislation that is
suited to protect the public interest. The most viable solution is public
utilities regulation applicable to all hospitals alike. As has been shown,
it is a form of regulation which the court may accept, and however distasteful the rate regulation aspect may appear to hospital management,
the more orderly development of health care facilities that will result
therefrom will make the legislation significantly worthwhile.
ROBERT

A. BRADY

Would You Sue Your Spouse?
The majority of the jurisdictions in the United States view the marital
relationship as a disability to the marital partners, and toll the running
of statutes of limitations as to claims arising between them.' However,
in Fulp v. Fulp2 North Carolina cast its lot with the minority and disallowed a wife's claim against her husband on the ground that the
statute of limitations barred the action. Justice Sharp took the following dicta from Graves v. Howard3 to support the decision.
The statutes of limitations contain no exception in favor of the wife
when she holds a claim against her husband . . . Disputes with respect to property may arise between -them when the separate existence of the wife, and a separate right of property, are recognized at
law, as in this state, as well as other matters; and when they do arise,
there is a great necessity for a judicial determination of the questions
as when they arise between other parties. A litigation of the kind between husband and wife may be unseemly and abhorrent to our ideas
of propriety, but a litigation in one form can be no more so than another, and no more so that the necessity itself which gives rise to the
litigation.
1. See, e.g., Wehoffer v. Wehoffer, 176 Or. 345, 156 P.2d 830 (1945); Campbell
v. Mickelson, 227 Wis. 429, 279 N.W. 73 (1938); Graham v. Wilson, 168 Mo. App.
185, 153 S.W. 83 (1912); Stockwell v. Stockwell, 92 Vt. 489, 105 A. 30 (1918); Hamby
v. Brooks, 86 Ark. 448, 111 S.W. 277 (1908); Barnett v. Harshbarger, 105 Ind. 410,
5 N.E. 718 (1886).
2. 264 N.C. 20, 140 S.E.2d 708 (1965).

3.

159 N.C. 594, 598, 75 S.E. 998, 1000 (1912).
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